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Abstract—Wireless network security has received tremendous
attention due to the vulnerabilities exposed in the open commu-
nication medium. The most common wireless Medium Access
Control (MAC) protocol is IEEE 802.11, which assumes all
the nodes in the network are cooperative. However, nodes may
purposefully misbehave in order to disrupt network performance,
obtain extra bandwidth and conserve resources. These MAC
layer misbehaviours can lead to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
which can disrupt the network operation. There is a lack of
comprehensive analysis of MAC layer misbehaviour driven DoS
attacks for the IEEE 802.11 protocol. This research studied
possible MAC layer DoS attack strategies that are driven by the
MAC layer malicious/selfish nodes and investigates the perfor-
mance of the IEEE 802.11 protocol. Such DoS attacks caused by
malicious and selfish nodes violating backoff timers associated
with the protocol. The experimental and analytical approach
evaluates several practical MAC layer backoff value manipulation
and the impact of such attacks on the network performance
and stability in MANETs. The simulation results show that
introducing DoS attacks at MAC layer could significantly affect
the network throughput and data packet collision rate. This
paper concludes that DoS attacks with selfish/malicious intend
can obtain a larger throughput by denying well-behaved nodes
to obtain deserved throughput, also DoS attacks with the intend
of complete destruction of the network can succeed.
Index Terms—Wireless Network Security, IEEE 802.11,
Medium Access Control, Denial of Service, MAC Layer Mis-
behaviours
I. INTRODUCTION
MANETs are self-organized networks, which could change
the topology dynamically without a centralized control.
MANETs have many applications in different domains such
as tactical networks in military communication for automated
battlefield and disaster recovery planning. The wireless nodes
in a MANET communicate by forwarding packets on behalf
of other nodes by working as routers in multi-hop commu-
nication channel. Therefore, MANETs need to contain the
basic security requirements such as availability, fairness, data
confidentiality and integrity. MANET based wireless networks
using the IEEE 802.11 protocol as the MAC layer protocol;
this standard assumes that all the nodes in the wireless
network adhere to the protocol, and fully cooperates with
the protocol. However, selfish or malicious mobile stations
may not adhere the IEEE 802.11 protocol rules when sharing
the wireless channel. In IEEE 802.11 based ad hoc networks,
MAC protocol related misbehaviours such as backoff timer
and differ timer manipulation can drastically reduced network
performance. Our research investigates such violations which
could cause a network unfairness also could drive to Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks. Experiment results show that it could be
devastating in MANET environment due to its strict bandwidth
constraints. MAC layer misbehaviour attacks evaluation could
improve the accuracy and capability of MAC layer selfish and
malicious misbehaviour detection mechanisms [5].
MAC layer malicious misbehaviour can be divided into link
layer jamming and DoS attacks. DoS attacks can be single
adversary attacks (SSA) or colluding adversary attacks (CAA).
The SAA attacks inject enormous amounts of Request to Send
(RTS) packets to the network. CAA attacks could deplete the
channel bandwidth in their vicinity in order to disturb the
communication. Although, these attacks are easy to execute,
given their nature they are easy detect [1]. However, in our
research, we consider low/moderate/higher rate DoS attacks
which selfish or malicious misbehaviour nodes could launch
at MAC layer by manipulating IEEE 802.11 backoff timers.
These DoS attacks are relatively new variants of DoS attacks
and difficult to detect since they are not sending a stream
of traffic such as conventional jamming attacks (SAA and
CAA). Because countermeasures used to handle the jamming
DoS attacks are not suitable for these types of attacks. The
rest of the paper has organized as follows: the next section
elaborates the related work of MAC layer misbehaviour anal-
ysis. Section III investigates the theoretical aspects of the
MAC protocol operation and provides a summary of the MAC
layer misbehaviour which can cause low to high rate DoS
attacks. Section IV analyses the DoS attack’s impact. Section
V discusses the outcome of the research experiments in detail.
Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of contributions
and detection mechanism suggestion.
A. Research Contribution
MAC layer DoS attacks caused by the MAC layer selfish
and malicious misbehaviours are not particularly discussed
in detail in the literature. We simulate new attacks and their
behaviour in ns2 simulation environment to demonstrate the
attack feasibility, as well as the potential impact of these978-1-4799-5344-8/15/$31.00 c© 2015 IEEE
attacks to 802.11 based networks. This research demonstrates
that low/moderate/higher level selfishness can lead to DoS
attacks which can affect the network throughput and even
network collapses in practically. The experimental results
contribute to extend the IEEE 802.11 protocol to prevent and
detect similar MAC layer DoS attacks. Case studies are chosen
to demonstrate the vulnerabilities in standard protocols which
gives provision to design a resilient MAC protocol for such
backoff value violation attacks. Finally, the research suggest a
trust management based detection mechanism for MANET.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, several researchers have evaluated MAC
layer misbehaviours in the IEEE 802.11 protocol. The
research done by [2] [3] has conducted a similar evaluation
for greedy receiver misbehaviour in IEEE 802.11 Hotspots.
Their research was motivated by the observation that many
hotspot users receive more traffic than they send. The research
in [3] identifies a range of greedy receiver misbehaviours,
and quantify their damage using both simulation and testbed
experiments. The results show that greedy receivers can result
in very serious damage, including completely shutting off the
competing traffic including starvation. Their research focuses
on the effects of greedy receivers in fixed rate environments.
However, they have also explored attacks under adaptive
rate. Under adaptive rate the damage of faking ACKs can
be reduced. In contrast, the damage of spoofing ACKs can
increase and incur significant performance degradation, which
may benefit the greedy receiver.
In [4] the authors have analysed and simulated the RTS/CTS
DoS attack variants in 802.11 networks which is one type
of low rate DoS attack that capable to exploit the medium
reservation mechanism of IEEE 802.11 networks through
duration field. Their research proposing a RTS/CTS attack
which changes the Network Allocation Vector(NAV) value in
RTS/CTS control packet. The attacker could set the maximum
value for the NAV duration field, and if the attacker uses a
data rate of 30 frames/s then the attacker can prevent genuine
nodes from accessing the channel [4]. The research done
by P. Kyasanaur et al. [6] have proposed a modification to
the existing standard IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol in order
to address the problem of sender backoff manipulation in
WLANs. In their approach, the receiver is trustworthy and
assigns backoff value to the sender and the receiver monitors
the sender, by checking whether the sender deviates from the
protocol. However, such detection mechanism is not capable to
handle receivers backoff manipulation. In [7] authors have pro-
posed a detection mechanism for MANET which is capable of
detecting several selfish misbehaviours. However, this method
also needs to trust at least one party in a communication which
is not a valid assumption in adhoc networks. Furthermore,
in [8] has studied DoS attacks and countermeasures in IEEE
802.11 wireless networks. The research in [9] has presented a
comprehensive analysis of modern MAC layer misbehaviour
detection mechanisms. Therefore, it is important to analyse
protocol vulnerabilities experimentally for better design of
MAC protocols. [10].
III. MAC LAYER MISBEHAVIOUR DRIVEN DOS
ATTACKS
MAC layer misbehaviour driven DoS attacks are the main
focus of this research. These misbehaviour nodes initial intend
may be to achieve higher channel access frequency (selfish)
by manipulating backoff value timers. However, with the
greediness increases of such nodes, the network starts to suffer
with low/moderate/high level DoS attacks (malicious). This
section explains the IEEE 802.11 channel sharing operation
using Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) and newly
proposed MAC layer backoff timer violations.
A. IEEE 802.11 with DCF
DCF uses the BEB mechanism to assign backoff values
to each wireless station in the network, aiming to allow
each wireless station to get a fair share of the wireless
channel. When a wireless node wants to transmit data, firstly
it senses the channel status. If the channel is busy it waits
for distributed inter frame space (DIFS) time. Then the node
enters the Contention Window (CW) time scale where the
node calculates the random backoff value. Next, if the medium
becomes idle after additional DIFS time, the node starts to
decrement backoff counter until the channel becomes busy or
counter reaches zero. If the channel becomes busy before the
counter becomes zero, then the node freezes its timer. This
process continues until backoff counter reaches zero. Then
the node starts to send the first control packet Request to
Send (RTS), the receiver then responds after a small inter
frame space (SIFS) with a Clear to Send (CTS) packet. After
another SIFS time the sender transmits the DATA packet.
Finally, the receiver acknowledges the data by sending an ACK
packet. Occasionally, two nodes can reach zero in the same
time, in which case collision will happen and the node has to
recalculate the backoff value.
B. Denial of Service Attacks
In our research, we exploit the DCF backoff time interval
to achieve low/moderate/high DoS attacks. The CTS control
packet has been used by the malicious/selfish receivers to
favour colluded senders which wants to access the channel
more frequently. These misbehaviours could also use to disrupt
the network services hence legitimate wireless nodes cannot
access the network services. The first case study is the sender
bakoff value manipulation to start DoS attack by capturing
the channel more frequently, which will lead other legitimize
nodes to wait longer to access the channel. The second misbe-
haviour case study is the misbehaving receivers misconducts
the CTS control transmission to override selected sender’s
backoff value policy by allowing to transmit more frequently.
Case studies are chosen to demonstrate the vulnerabilities in
standard protocol which gives provision to design a resilient
MAC protocol to detect and prevent such attacks.
• Case Study 1: Sender Generating DoS Attacks
The primary intention of this case study is to demonstrate
the MAC layer backoff timers manipulation by the sender
with malicious or selfish purpose. The misbehaving senders
select small backoff values (different backoff value policy)
instead of randomly selected backoff value, or ignore to
increment the attempt number after a collision which is used
to calculate the CW value eventually backoff value. The Fig.
1 demonstrates the DoS attack which can be initiated from
such senders while their greediness increases to higher level,
then network will deny the services for good nodes. In this
backoff value violation model, if a sender has a greediness of
20% (misbehaviour percentage), then the sender only waits for
80% of the actual allocated backoff value by the IEEE 802.11
protocol. In such scenario, these senders can act as a source
for a DoS attack.
Fig. 1. Sender manipulates its backoff value to access the channel more
frequently
• Case Study 2: Receiver Generating DoS Attacks
In the IEEE 802.11 protocol the receiver misbehaviours can
be in different forms such as, changing backoff values of
selected senders, change NAV of neighbours and dropping
CTS packets intentionally. Such behaviours can be seen as
selfish or malicious purpose which could be leading to a DoS
attacks. This research, demonstrates a receiver misbehaviour
based on a CTS modification where the receiver uses CTS
transmission to modify the senders’ backoff value selection
policy. The receiver updates the selected senders backoff
selection policy value to increase/decrease the sender’s backoff
value. In the Fig. 2 and the following code, if the receiver tries
to favour a selected sender, then the receiver will reduce the
sender’s backoff value or increase otherwise. The malicious
receiver could also manipulates the CTS time-out value in the
CTS transmission to mislead genuine nodes who trying to send
data packets.
Mac_IEEE_802_11::sendCTS(senderID,RTS duration) {
...........................................
/*The receiver obtain the backoff value of sender*/
senderBackoff = getbackoff(senderID)
/*The misbehaving attacker updating senders
backoff value selection policy in CTS transmission with
different CW distribution */
ReceiverUpdateBackoffPolicy(senderID,newbackoffpolicy);
...................................
}
The following code segment shows the modification required
for the backoff timer class to follow different backoff policy.
BackoffTimer::start(int backoff, double difs){
...........
/*Calculate the backoff based on the policy selected
,backoff policy can be as below executed by sender or
recvr*/
switch(backoff_policy) {
//Normal 802.11 scheme
case 0:
rslots=backoff;
break;
//Sender misbehaving, set backoff to misb_perc always
case 1:
rslots = MISB_PERC;
break;
//Sender misbehaving,set backoff-backoff*MISB_PERC/100
case 2:
rslots=backoff-(backoff * MISB_PERC/100);
break;
//Receiver Misbehaviour with REC_MIS% value,
case 3:
rslots= (backoff - (backoff*(REC_MIS/100));
break;
}
..........
In the simulation script nodes are set to follow certain misbe-
haviour policy with a certain misbehaviour percentage.
Fig. 2. The receiver manipulate senders backoff value in the CTS
IV. SIMULATIONS CONFIGURATION
The protocols, selfish and malicious misbehaviour driven
DoS attacks, network topologies and required C++ modifi-
cations, simulation scripts have been simulated in ns2 2.35
network simulator. The Table I presents the wireless nodes
CBR traffic and simulation configuration parameters. The sim-
ulation configures a sender misbehaviour percentage (SMP)
which represents the percentage of the backoff value slots that
the sender reduces from the originally assigned backoff value,
which has also been referred as selfish nodes’ greediness. The
receive misbehaviour percentage (RMP) is configures, such a
way that the receiver is misbehaving by colluding with senders
randomly. In our study, the receiver identifies the sender to
collude in the network and then reduces its backoff values
slots by an RMP. Initially, the purpose of such a attack could
be selfish(frequent channel access), however, in good nodes
point of view, it is a moderate or higher rate DoS attack.
TABLE I
SIMULATION CONFIGURATION
Simulation Configuration
Network Model ADHOC
Simulation Area 1500x750 m
Routing protocol DSR
Simulation time 500 s
Simulation Runs 10x11x5
Total nodes 11
misbehaviour nodes (3 - 9)
Max moving speed 10 m/s
Average moving speed 3.82 m/s
Route changes 123
CBR Traffic Configuration
Traffic type CBR
Packet size 512 bytes
Packet interval 0.25 S
Max no of packets 100000
A. Performance Metrics
Performance metrics are considered to measure the DoS
attack impact on the network performance, such as well-
behaving node throughput, selfish/malicious node throughput
and packet collision rate (CR). The well-behaving node’s
throughput is important to identify the effect of the DoS attack
for good wireless nodes. This value is obtained by dividing
the total throughput achieved by good nodes by the number of
good nodes. The average throughput of selfish/malicious nodes
gives a clear measurement for the overall network performance
degradation and the advantage achieved by the misbehaviour
nodes. This is obtained by dividing the total misbehaviour
nodes’ throughput by the number of total misbehaving nodes.
The CR is calculated by the equation (1) the divides the
total collided packets of each node by the total packets
transmitted in the network, where collided packets are denoted
by colPktNum and total packets by denoted by the sum of
colPktNum and nonColPktNum.
CR =
∑N−1
i=0 colPktNum[i]∑N−1
i=0 (colPktNum[i] + nonColPktNum[i])
(1)
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Simulation results have been obtained with performance
metrics for each MAC layer misbehaviour driven DoS attack
scenarios, different mobility patterns, topologies and traffic
rates.
A. Sender Generated DoS Attack Result Analysis
This section analyses the simulation results of different
sender bakcoff value manipulation scenarios by focussing the
impact on nodes’ throughput and data packet CR. Furthermore,
sender misbehaviour simulations have been extended to study
the effect of increasing the selfish nodes greediness, the
number of misbehaving nodes and CBR traffic rate.
1) Increase Misbehaviour Greediness: Increasing the
greediness means allow misbehaviour nodes to access the
wireless channel more frequently. Figure. 3 shows the average
throughput of good nodes and misbehaving nodes when the
sender greediness increases from 10% to 90% (SMP). Other
parameters such as the CBR traffic rate, total number of nodes
(11) and the number of misbehaving nodes are constant as
shown in Table I. It is clear that misbehaving nodes achieve
higher throughput with higher SMP. Similarly, good nodes
are suffering from lower throughput. For example, when the
greediness percentage (SMP) is 50%, misbehaviour nodes’
throughput dramatically increases to more than 3 times of
good node (from about 500kbps to about 1500kbps). After
50% SMP the network acts as a low rate DoS for good
nodes while misbehaving nodes having access to the channel
more frequently. Furthermore, Fig. 3 shows that misbehaving
nodes achieve higher average throughput than good nodes
under all SMP from 10% to 90%. The misbehaving nodes’
average throughput increase gradually and the good nodes’
decreases gradually, making the gap between the average
throughputs of both groups bigger. The CR analysis is
Fig. 3. Throughput with increasing senders misbehaviour percentage(SMP)
important to demonstrate the effect of misbehaviours for the
network stability. The result in Fig. 4 shows the effect of
increasing the aggressiveness of the DoS attack for the network
CR. The CR has increased more than 5 times (from 0.5% to
nearly 2.5%).
2) Increase Misbehaviour Nodes: Figure. 5 demonstrates
the simulation results obtained with increasing number of mis-
behaving nodes, but keeping the total nodes (11), SMP (40%)
and traffic rate constant. According to the graph, this can cause
Fig. 4. CR with increasing senders misbehaviour percentage(SMP)
severe harm to the network performance due to the DoS attack
generating by misbehaviour nodes. The good nodes’ average
throughput gradually decreases to a lower range with higher
number of misbehaving nodes in the network. Furthermore,
initially misbehaviour node’s throughput start to rise with
less number of misbehaving nodes because many misbehaving
nodes compete each other for the channel access. Then,
misbehaviour nodes’ throughput gradually goes down with
higher number of misbehaving nodes. This result suggests that
increasing the number of misbehaving nodes doesn’t really
help for misbehaving nodes to maintain a higher throughput,
but it helps to disrupt the network services. When the network
has reached a state even misbehaving nodes can not gain
more throughput. This graph behaviour can be explained in
different point of view. Firstly, The increase the number of
DoS attack launching misbehaving nodes (Fig. 6) can cause the
network data packet CR to increase in considerable margins
(from 0.3% to nearly 3.0%). Secondly, selfish nodes start to
compete each other for optimal throughput and this can lead to
increased CR thus lower throughput. Eventually, competitive
selfish misbehaviours causes a perfect DoS attack situation for
the network.
Fig. 5. Throughput with Increasing number of DoS attack launching senders
Fig. 6. CR with increasing number of DoS attack launching sender
3) Increase Network CBR Traffic: CBR traffic has changed
from 1 packet per second to 16 packets per second to observe
the throughput of the network. This means that DoS attack
source traffic generating speed increases to moderate to high.
The results show bad nodes have achieved the best throughput
when the packet rate is moderate (4 packets/second) and then
dramatically goes down when packet rates increases in the DoS
situation in the network. The Fig. 7 shows that the increasing
network traffic rate will severely affect the good node through-
put as the DoS attack nodes deny the access to the good nodes.
Good nodes throughput dramatically decreases after the packet
rate increases more than 4 packets per second. The main reason
is while backoff value manipulation helps malicious or selfish
nodes to access the channel more frequently, the CR increase
for good nodes. Therefore, the higher traffic rates will help
the attacker to launch the DoS attack more successfully.
Fig. 7. Nodes throughput while increasing network CBR traffic rate
B. Receiver Generated DoS Attack Result Analysis
In MANETs receivers can be non-cooperative, and could
misbehave by changing selected sender’s random backoff
value in CTS transmission. Greedy or malicious intended
receivers could result in higher rate DoS attacks. These re-
ceivers favour misbehaving senders to increase their channel
access possibility, and also increases the malicious or selfish
traffic generation. The graph presented in Fig. 8 shows that
well-behaving nodes have dramatically reduced throughput
due to higher throughput achieved by misbehaving nodes.
Furthermore, good nodes hardly get any throughput when
malicious receiver attacking rate increases (RMP). Therefore,
increase of RMP will cause good nodes to wait longer times
to access the channel and can be a possible network collapse.
The Fig. 9 demonstrates the scenario of the CR of the network
Fig. 8. Throughput with increasing number of DoS attack launching receiver
aggressiveness (RMP)
when malicious/selfish senders collude with bad receivers to
launch the DoS attack. In this case network suffered with
a large number of collisions resulted increase of CR range
(from 0.1% to 3.5%). DoS attack has been the reason for
the performance degradation explained in Fig. 8. So colluded
receivers can really shutdown the network with the support of
senders who are already launching moderate level DoS attack.
VI. PREVENTION MECHANISM AND CONCLUSION
This paper has analysed MAC layer misbehaviour driven
DoS attacks with IEEE 802.11 in MANET environment. The
research has successfully performed analysis of standard IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol’s sender and receiver backoff value
violations which lead to partial and severe DoS attacks. The
results show the effect of such DoS attacks for the network
throughput and data packet CR. Therefore, IEEE 802.11
MAC protocol is not resilient against the MAC layer DoS
attacks generated by backoff value policy violation at MAC
layer.These practical investigations help to design resilient
MAC layer protocols for MANETs. IEEE 802.11 protocol
requires enhancements for detecting and penalizing the DoS
attacks at MAC layer. MANETs are unique networks with
unique characteristics which could lead such DoS attacks to
be very effective. Such designs need to consider that MANET
Fig. 9. CR with increasing number of DoS attack launching sender and
receivers
has no centralized management to deploy mechanism to detect
such attacks. We suggest decentralized detection mechanism
at MAC layer to apply with a better trust management mech-
anism. Also, there is a requirement for a transparent backoff
value allocation and monitoring. A novel trust management
mechanism among the nodes could help the network nodes to
be aware of such protocol violations, thus nodes knows which
nodes to trust in their communication.
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